New York Times Editorial - Porous U.S. air defenses

New York Times Editorial - Porous U.S. air defenses
Copyright by The New York Times
Published: August 15, 2006


No topic investigated by the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks hatched more conspiracy theories than the failure of U.S. air defense systems to intercept any of the four planes that had been hijacked by terrorists. That makes three new reports particularly welcome. Together, they shed some light on why civil aviation authorities, the military and the highest officials of the Bush administration failed to respond quickly enough to avert catastrophe.

The reports include a new book written by the co-chairmen of the 9/11 commission, an article in Vanity Fair magazine based on tapes released by the military, and a 2005 report from the inspector general of the Defense Department that was finally released last week. They paint a picture of confusion as civilian and military authorities struggled to grasp and respond to what was happening. There was absolutely no evidence that any air defenders deliberately stood aside to let the terrorists have their way or that the military itself fired a cruise missile into the Pentagon, as conspiracy theories have suggested.
The Federal Aviation Administration, which was monitoring civilian air traffic, dropped the ball repeatedly. Its critical mistake was assuming that the transponders on hijacked planes would stay on, displaying each plane's identity and altitude. The agency also failed miserably in its duty to alert the military. It provided nine minutes' warning before the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center, two minutes' warning that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward Washington and no advance notice of the other two hijacked flights. However, the FAA did tell the military, erroneously, that a plane that had already hit the World Trade Center was still headed south toward Washington. As a result, the military scrambled two planes to chase a ghost that no longer existed.

The military had its own problems. The North American Aerospace Defense Command, or Norad, had its radars pointing outward to detect external threats. Only four planes were armed and ready to intercept terrorists in the eastern region of the country. And when the military dispatched two of those fighters to protect Washington, they raced out to sea instead of taking a position to defend the city.